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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff seeks to appeal well settled law that one party cannot sue another's attorneys during 
the course of litigation. Although spun by Plaintiff as "novel" theories and "creative7'pleading, well 
settled Idaho law does not recognize, nor would a reasonable extension of Idaho law recognize, 
Plaintiff's tactical invasion of the attomeylclient relationship. 
The district court properly dismissed all of Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant attorneys 
("HTEH") under Rule 12(b)(6). It did so based on the proper record and by determining that 
Plaintiff did not have standing to pursue claims against his opponents' lawyers and that no legal duty 
was owed to him by those. In addition, as to each of the individual causes of action pled, a 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss was proper because of insufficient, conclusory pleading or because each failed as 
a matter of law. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
HTEH generally agrees with Plaintiff's course of proceedings but would add the following: 
On March 8, 2007 the district court, in the Underlying Action, enjoined Plaintiff from 
attempting to interfere with the operation or management of AIA Services or AIA Insurance. (R. 
Vol. 3, p. 470.) The district court entereda Preliminary Injunction prohibiting Plaintiff from acting, 
or attempting to act, as manager andlor a board member of AIA Insurance, Inc., andlor from 
harassing andlor interfering with the management of AIA Insurance, Inc., and AIA Services 
Corporation. (Id.) That Order remains in effect. 
On December 8,2008, shortly before filing the present action, Plaintiff moved to disqualify 
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HTEH in Taylor v. AIA, et al. ("Underlying Action"). (R., Additional Clerk's Record, p. 521.) 
On June 17,2009 the district court, in the Underlying Action, filed its Opinion and Order on 
summary judgment. (See Motion to Augment Record.) The district court ruled that the written 
agreements upon which Plaintiff based all of his claims in the Underlying Action were illegal and 
unenforceable. (Id.) The result of this ruling, as a matter of law, is that the parties are left as the 
court found them, meaning that Plaintiff does not have a secured interest, is and cannot be a 
shareholder or director, is not a stock pledgee, and is not a creditor of an insolvent corporation. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
HTEH does not agree with the characterization of the various unproven and conclusory 
allegations as "facts" and takes issue with the omission of relevant facts in Plaintiff's statement of 
facts and wishes to submit and/or add the following: 
In the Underlying Action Plaintiff sued AIA Services upon a contract to redeem his stock. 
He also named as Defendants AIA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance and various officers and 
directors of the three corporations. HTEH represented AIA Services and AIA Insurance and 
appeared as local counsel for CropUSA in the Underlying Action. 
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
HTEH feels the issues on appeal can be inore clearly and completely stated as follows: 
1. Did the district court properly dismiss Plaintiffs complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6)? 
a. Does the invited error doctrine apply to the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal? 
b. Did the district court properly take judicial notice of its own rulings and the records 
in the related but separate case of Taylor v. AIA Services, et al.? 
c. If the district court erred in going beyond the allegations in the complaint, was any 
such error harmless? 
2. Does Plaintiff have standing to bring any direct or derivative claims against the attorneys 
representing an opposing party? 
3. Does HTEH owe a duty to Plaintiff as the opposing party in litigation or as a non-client in 
transactional work? 
4. Does the litigation privilege apply giving HTEH immunity against all claims or causes of 
action alleged by Plaintiff arising out of its representation of its clients? 
5. Did the district court properly dismiss each cause of action and deny the motion to amend 
to add new causes of action based on insufficient pleading or as a matter of law? 
6. Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to HTEH? 
7. Is HTEH entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 
and Idaho Code 9 12-121, Idaho Code 5 48-608 and Idaho Code 5 30-1-746? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review on Appeal. 
1. Standard of Review of a Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal. 
"The well-pleaded facts must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. A 
plaintiff, however, must allege specific facts, not conclusory allegations. Conclusory allegations and 
unwarranted deductions are not admitted as true." Scott v. Steinhagen Oil Co., Znc., 224 F.Supp.2d 
1084,1085 (E.D.Texas 2002). Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual 
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Myers v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 
America, 5 F.Supp.2d 423,427 (1998). The pleadings are not sufficient where the plaintiff relies 
on "subjective characterizations or unsubstantiated conclusions" or on "bald assertions, 
unsupportable conclusions and opprobrious epithets." Flemingv. Lind- Waldockd; Co., 922 F.2d 20, 
23 (1 Cir. 1990). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter 
of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief. Klusty v. Taco Bell Corp., 909 F.Supp. 516, 519 
2. Standard of Review of Denial of Motion to Amend. 
Whether to permit an amended pleading is committed to the sound discretion of the district 
court. McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228,61 P.3d 585 (2002). Indeterminingwhetheran amended 
complaint should be allowed, the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to he inserted 
into the action by the amended complaint state a valid claim or whether the opposing party has an 
available defense to the newly added claim. Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 
Idaho 41,44,122 P.3d 300,303 (2005). The trial court should decline to grant leave to amend where 
the amendment would be a futile act. Wells v. United States Life Ins. Co. I 19 Idaho 160,804 P.2d 
333 (Ct.App. 1991). An "amendment is futile if the [pleadings], as amended, would not survive a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." C! S. v. Union 
Corp., 194 F.R.D. 223,237 (E.D.Pa. 2000). 
3. Standard of Review for Award of Attornev Fees. 
An award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. 
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,165 P.3d 261 (2007). To prove an abuse of discretion this Court looks to 
three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal standards 
applicable to specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason. (Id.) 
B. Analvsis. 
1. The District Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint Under Rule 
12tbM6). 
Plaintiff claims that the district court erred in the following manner: (1) it failed to apply the 
correct Rule 12(b)(6) standard; (2) it considered matters outside of the appropriate record; and (3) 
it failed to convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment. 
a. A District Court is Allowed to Go Bevond the Alleeations in the Complaint 
on aRule 12(b)(6) Motion in Limited Circumstances Al~plicable to this Case. 
(i) Plaintiff Invited the District Court to Go Beyond the Complaint 
Allegations. 
There is no question that the district court referred to matters beyond the specific allegations 
in either the complaint or proposed amended complaint. As the district court correctly set forth in 
its Opinion and Order on Defendant's MotiontoDismiss and Plaintiff s Motion to Amend ("Opinion 
and Order"), the Malpractice Action "is rooted in the underlying case of Taylor v. AIA, et al.; Nez 
Perce County Case No. CV07-00208." (R. Vol. 111, p. 469.) ("Underlying Action"). ' The Court 
reviewed pertinent procedural matters and rulings from the Underlying Action. ad. at pp. 469-471 .) 
The Court recognized that "Reed Taylor's claims against the defendants are all based on conduct and 
actions engaged in by the defendants within the scope of the underlying litigation." ( Id. at 12.) 
However, the only record the district court looked to outside of the allegations in the complaint and 
proposed amended complaint was that found in the court files of the Underlying Action. 
'The district court judge in the Malpractice Action is the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie. 
Judge Brudie is also the district court judge in the Underlying Action. 
Plaintiff, in both the complaint and proposed amended complaint, invited the district court 
to consider the Underlying Action. Indeed, nearly every factual allegation in the complaint and 
proposed amended complaint refers to actions and conduct in the Underlying Action and forms the 
bases for the Malpractice Action. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 239-264; pp. 406-453.) The complaints, 
specifically and in detail, allege the existence of the Underlying Action, describe the causes of action 
sought in that action and base the allegations in this Malpractice Action on the Underlying Action. 
(R. Vol. 2, pp. 243-245, 15-19; R. Vol. 2, pp. 411-419, ll 16-39.) 
More importantly, Plaintiff expressly requested the district court to take judicial notice of 
all matters that took place in the Underlying Action. 
Mr. Bissell: . . . Also, your Honor, I would - I would ask the court because we 
obviously - we have talked about a lot of information in the past in this case and in 
other cases and, you know, a lot of the information in the other cases kind of has an 
impact on this case. So I would ask the court to take iudicial notice of everything 
that's been followed. armed in those previous cases - or any other matter, the 
underlying matter we mirrht call it. the Reed v. AIA matter which is 07-00208. 
The Court: Well, that was actually my intention, Mr. Bissell, that's part of what I 
came to conclude is I really can't discuss this and rule on the pending motion to 
dismiss without the consideration of the underlying case so that was actually my 
intention. 
Mr. Bissell: Okay, thank you, your Honor. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 70,ll. 9-23.) (Emphasis added.) 
A party cannot consciously invite district court actions, and then successfully claim these 
actions are erroneous on appeal. Sidote v. State, 587 P.2d 1317 (Nev. 1978). Nor may a defendant 
successfully allege error in a ruling of the court, when the defendant himself requested the ruling. 
Stilley v. People, 417 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1966). It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not 
successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Wallingv. Walling, 36 Idaho 710, 
214 P. 218 (1923). Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversiblefiankv. Frank, 
47 Idaho 217, 273 P. 943 (1929). The doctrine of "invited error" applies to estop a party from 
asserting an error when his own conduct induces the commission of the error. Thomson v. Olsen, 
147 Idaho 99,205 P.3d 1235 (2009). 
Under the doctrine of invited error, the district court did not err in looking outside of the 
allegations in the complaints because Plaintiff invited the court to make its Rule 12(b)(6) decision 
based on an examination and consideration of all matters in the Underlying Action. 
(ii) The District Court Can Properly Take Judicial Notice of its Own 
Rulings and the Records in the Underlying Action. 
When ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, courts must consider the complaint in its 
entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when making such rulings, in particular, 
documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court mav take 
judicial notice. Tellabs v. Makor Issues &Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 127 S.Ct 2499,2509 (2007) 
(citing 5B Wright & Miller 5 1357 (3d Ed. 2004 and Supplement 2007)); Hellickson v. Jenkins, 11 8 
Idaho 273,796 P.2d 150 (Ct.App. 1990). Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, the district court 
may take judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the same =a 
separate case. (I.R.E. 201(c).) 
In ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court in the present Malpractice 
Action considered matters in the court records of the related but separate Underlying Action over 
which the district court also presided. Regardless of the invitation to do so, the district court was 
permitted to take judicial notice of the court files in that separate case when it ruled on the 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss. 
(iii) Any Error by the District Court in Going Beyond the Allegations of 
the Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint was Harmless. 
Even if the district court committed error in its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal by accepting 
Plaintiffs invitation to take judicial notice of matters beyond the allegations in the complaint and 
proposed amended complaint, any error was harmless because, as described more fully infra, this 
Court can uphold the dismissal on other grounds. Banning v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 89 Idaho 
506,510,406 P.2d 802, 803 (1965). Based solely on a review of the allegations in the complaint 
and proposed amended complaint and without regard to the record in the Underlying Action, each 
of the causes of action can properly be dismissed as insufficiently pled, or as a matter of law for lack 
of standing, or lack of aprima facie element such as duty. 
2. Plaintiff Has No Standing to Bring Anv Direct or Derivative Causes of Action 
or Claims Against HTEH as Counsel for the Owoosin- Party. 
Whether Plaintiff has standing to sue his adversaries' litigation counsel is a question of law 
which was appropriately determined by the district court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Thompson 
v. Cityoflewiston, 137 Idaho 473,50 P.3d 488 (2002); Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 
44 P.3d 1157 (2002); Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292, 17 P.3d 236 (2000). 
a. Plaintiff Has No Standing to Sue HTEH Directlv as a Stock Pledgee. 
Plaintiff primarily alleges that he has standing to sue HTEH @ire-c& because stock in a 
subsidiary corporation (AIA Insurance) is pledged as security for the payment of the redemption 
price by the insolvent parent corporation (AIA Services). He asserts he may bring direct claims 
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against HTEH to preserve his interest in the stock of AIA Insurance. However, this theory 
disregards the obvious point that HTEH does not have possession of, or claim any interest in, such 
stock. Nor does the complaint or proposed amended complaint allege any such connection. The 
complaints allege only that HTEH, acting as defense counsel, asserted positions contrary to those 
espoused by Plaintiff? HTEH is entitled to represent its clients' legal positions in court and cannot 
be held liable to Plaintiff for doing so, regardless of Plaintiffs allegations that he is a stock pledgee. 
The cases cited by Plaintiff are inapposite. For example, inEmpire Life Ins. Co. ofAmerica 
v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5Ih Cir. 1972), the court was carefkl to point out that, "It is, however, 
an established rule that if a plaintiff sues in a stockholder capacity for corporate mismanagement, 
he must bring the suit derivatively in the name of the corporation." (Id. at 335.) While some courts 
have recognized an exception to the rule that does not apply here, Plaintiff has no d&@ cause of 
action. As will be discussed in greater detail, HTEH owes no duty to Plaintiff as a stock pledgee. 
To the contrary, HTEH's duty is solely to advocate the legal position of its clients, who dispute 
Plaintiffs claims that he possesses an enforceable right to receive preferential payment for his stock 
in AIA  service^.^ 
'For example, 7 14 of Plaintiffs complaint alleges that HTEH "engaged in inappropriate 
conduct in assisting parties (including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or . . . maintaining a 
restraining order and preliminary injunction against Plaintiff, when Defendants knew there was 
no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and tortious 
interference with Plaintiffs contractual rights, and that the assets and fknds of AIA Insurance 
were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded." This allegation was made despite the 
intervening act of the district court in granting this relief. 
3HTEH's client's position was recently vindicated when the district court found the 
agreement upon which Plaintiffs alleged status as a stock pledgee to be illegal. 
In Gustafson v. Gustafson, 734 P.2d 949 (Wa. App. 1987), relied upon by Plaintiff, the ex- 
spouse of a shareholder and the pledgee of the shareholder's stock as security for amounts owing 
pursuant to a divorce decree was held to possess both a derivative and a direct cause of action against 
the shareholder for Eraudulent dissipation of corporate assets by corporate insiders. Gustafson did 
not hold that the ex-spouse possessed a direct cause of action against either her former husband's -
lawyers or the corporation's lawyers. None of the cases relied on by Plaintiff so hold. In the present 
case, Plaintiff does not allege that he has any direct contractual or other relationship with HTEH, as 
was the case between Mr. and Mrs. Gustafson. Plaintiff has no standing as a stock pledgee to bring 
suit against counsel for opposing parties in pending litigation. 
b. Plaintiff Has No Standing to Sue HTEH as the Alleged Sole Shareholder or 
Director. 
Plaintiff also argues that he has standing to sue HTEH directly because he is the only 
shareholder and director of AIA Insurance. This argument is predicated on the assumption that 
Plaintiff is entitled to repossess the stock of AIA Insurance and to become its sole shareholder or 
director. Plaintiff places the cart before the horse. At the time of the 12(b)(6) dismissal, the district 
court in the Underlying Action had not ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to exercise that remedy, and 
certainly had not ruled that he is entitled to regain ownership and resume operation of AIA 
4 ~ n  fact, the district court has recently ruled that the contracts upon which Plaintiffs status 
as an alleged shareholder or director are illegal, the result of which is that Plaintiff cannot 
become the sole shareholder or a director. It is also contrary to the district court's Preliminary 
Injunction that Plaintiff cannot be the sole shareholder or a director until that status is legally 
adjudicated. 
Plaintiff fails to explain how, as a matter of law, an insider who is attempting to redeem his 
stock in an insolvent corporation purportedly has standing to sue litigation counsel for the 
corporation. HTEH has advocated (successfully) in open court positions which are contrary to 
Plaintiffs proposed course of action; but it is fully entitled, and indeed ethically obligated, to do so. 
c. Plaintiff Has No Standing to Sue HTEH as a Secured Creditor or Creditor of 
Insolvent Coruoration. 
Plaintiff argues he is entitled to bring a direct suit against HTEH because he is a secured 
creditor of AIA Services and alleges that the corporation made an unauthorized disposition of its 
collateral. His complaint does not allege that HTEH made an unauthorized disposition of such 
collateral or is in possession of the collateral, other than with respect to receipt of attorney's fees 
(which will be addressed infm). It does follow that Plaintiff has standing to sue HTEH simply 
because of the existence of a justiciable dispute between himself and the corporations. Whether or 
not Plaintiff as an alleged creditor possesses a direct cause of action against the corporation is 
meaningless insofar as he now seeks to sue HTEH directly. 
d. Plaintiff Has No Standing to Sue HTEH as a Third-Partv Beneficiary. 
As discussed below, the attomeyiclient relationship runs only to the client and not to third- 
party beneficiaries, except in the limited circumstance of intended beneficiaries of testamentary 
instruments. Hurrigfeldv. Huncock, 140 Idaho 134, 138,90 P.3d 887,888 (2004). Plaintiffhas not 
alleged any other relationship or contract for which he is a third-party beneficiary. Nor has he 
alleged that any contract was entered into between HTEH and its clients primarily for his intended 
benefit. All of the causes of action require an attorneylclient relationship with the Plaintiff as a 
prerequisite for holding the attorney liable for tort causes of action. Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 
259, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). Plaintiff has not alleged that he was an intended beneficiary of a 
testamentary instrument or that he had an attorneyiclient relationship with HTEH. Therefore, 
Plaintiff does not have standing to sue as a third-party beneficiary. 
3. HTEH Owes No Dutv to Plaintiff; All Tort Claims Brouvht bv Plaintiff Were 
Proaerlv Dismissed as a Matter of Law. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that many of Plaintiffs arguments depend upon 
the implicit assumption, although the complaints do not so allege, that he has already prevailed in 
the Underlying Action and has been awarded the relief requested in that litigation.' This pleading 
deficiency alone supports dismissal of Plaintiffs complaints. 
"The existence of a duty is a question of law over which [an appellate] Court exercises free 
review." Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,247,985 P.2d 669,672 (1999). "No liability arises 
from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff." Udy v. Custer County, 136 
Idaho 386,389,34 P.3d 1069,1072 (2001). This Court has held that "[als a general rule, an attorney 
will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client and not to someone with whom the attorney 
does not have an attorney-client relationship." Harrigfe1d ,i Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,137,90 P.3d 
884,887 (2004). Harrigfeld extended the attorney's duty to intended beneficiaries of testamentary 
instruments prepared by the attorney. (Id. at 138,90 P.3d at 888.) That is the &circumstance 
recognized by Idaho law where an attorney owes a duty of care to parties with whom the attorney 
'In fact, the recent Opinion and Order in the Underlying Action came to the exact 
opposite conclusion. (See Motion to Augment Record.) 
is not in privity or does not have an attorneylclient relationship. "An attorney owes no duty to a third 
party in an adversarial relationship." Bowman v. Two, 704 P.2d 140 (Wash. 1985). "Existence of 
a duty to an adversary party beyond the courtesy and respect owed all participants in the legal 
process. . . would interfere with the undivided loyalty an attorney owes a client and would diminish 
an attorney's ability to achieve the most advantageous position for a client." Id. at 189. The issue 
of whether or not to extend that duty to the circumstances of the present case is an issue of law to 
be decided by the court, not an issue of fact for the jury. The district court correctly determined as 
a matter of law that a lawyer's duty of care should not be extended to the facts alleged in his 
complaints. 
4. HTEH Has Immunitv From Liability for Any Claim. Cause of Action or Act 
Arising Out of Its Representation of Its Clients. 
a. Plaintiffs Tort Claims are Barred bv the Litigation Privilege. 
It would be particularly destructive of the attorney-client relationship if attorneys in alitigated 
matter were held to have a duty of care or loyalty to the adverse party - in effect, that they become 
co-counsel for the opponent. HTEH cannot possibly act as zealous advocates of its clients (as is 
required by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct) if it is also deemed to owe duties of care and 
loyalty to Plaintiff. 
The existence of a privilege or immunity is a question of law . Rincover v. State, Dept. of 
Finance, Securities Bureau, 128 Idaho 653,917 P.2d 1293 (1996). Section 890of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1979) provides: "One who otherwise would be liable for a tort is not liable if he 
acts in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of his own or of a privilege of another that 
was properly delegated to him." (Id.) The statements and conduct of an attorney who participates 
in the judicial process are protected by the litigation privilege. The privilege is not absolute; for 
instance, it does not permit a lawyer to steal documents, IBP, Inc., v. Klumpe, 101 S.W.3d, 461 
(Tex.App. 2001), to physically assault another party, Miller v. Stonehenge/FASA - Texas, 993 
F.Supp. 461 (N.D. Tex. 1998), or to commit acts which constitute abuse of process or malicious 
prosecution. Otherwise, the privilege is broad. "[Tlhe litigation privilege protects lawyers not only 
against defamation actions but against a host of other tort-related claims." Loigman v. Middletown, 
889 A.2d 426,436 (N.J. 2006). 
It was held in Loigman that an attorney who excluded a spectator and self-styled community 
watchdog from a hearing on the allegedly specious ground that the person was a potential witness 
was held to be immune from a 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 suit brought by the disgruntled watchdog. The court 
observed that "[tlhe common policy thread that runs through judicial, prosecutorial and witness 
immunity is the need to ensure that participants in the judicial process act without fear of the threat 
of ruinous civil litigation when performing their respective functions." Id., 889 A.2d at 436. The 
privilege applies even where the theories advanced against opposing counsel are new or innovative: 
Typically, the litigation privilege has been invoked by attorneys to safeguard 
them from defamation suits arising from comments made in the course of judicial 
proceedings. However, to address creative pleading, courts have extended the 
litigation privilege to cover unconventional and sometimes novel causes of action 
against attorneys acting within the judicial process. As one scholar put it, as new tort 
theories have emerged, courts have not hesitated to expand the privilege to cover 
theories, actions, and circumstancesnever contemplated by those who formulated the 
rule in medieval England. (Citations and internal quotations deleted) 
Id. 889 A.2d at 435-436. 
Numerous reported cases support the proposition that the privilege attaches where attorneys 
represent clients in litigation or other contested or adversarial matters. See Pacipc Gas &Electric 
Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal.3d 11 18, 1137,791 P.2d 587, 598 (1990). In fact, the privilege 
applies to any action except one for malicious prosecution. In some jurisdictions the privilege is 
absolute (e.g., Crockett &Myers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP, supra, 440 F.Supp.2d at 
1195), and in others it is qualified or conditional. In the latter jurisdictions the plaintiff must prove 
"a desire to harm, which is independent of and unrelated to the attorney's desire to protect his 
client." Schott v. Glover, 109 Ill.App.3d 230,440N.E.2d 376,379-80 (1982). Restatement of the 
Law Governing Lawyers 5 57(3) ("A lawyer who advises or assists a client to make or break a 
contract, to enter or dissolve a legal relationship, or to enter or not enter a contractual relation, is not 
liable to a nonclient for interference with contract or with prospective contractual relations or with 
a legal relationship, if the lawyer acts to advance the client's objectives without using wrongful 
means.") The case of Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stgel, 151 P.3d 732 
(2007), contains an extensive review of the authorities and the policy reasons for barring a litigant's 
claim for civil damages against an opposing attorney for statements made or actions taken in the 
course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party related to the civil litigation. The policy 
reasons include: 
(1) promoting the candid, objective, and undistorted disclosure of evidence; (2) 
placing the burden of testing evidence upon the litigants during trial; (3) avoiding the 
chilling effect resulting from the threat of subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the 
finality ofjudgments; (5) limiting collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting 
zealous advocacy; (7) discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging 
settlement. 
Id., 151 P.3d at 750. 
The allegations and causes of action in the present case relate to theories advanced, 
positions taken, comments made and defenses raised by HTEH in litigation or adversarial matters 
relating to disputed control of closely held corporations. Those corporations are entitled to zealous 
representation by attorneys of their own choosing, who should not be required to labor under 
constant threats of vindictive and retaliatory litigation by the adverse party. The litigation privilege 
applies to all tort causes of action, including professional malpractice, aiding and abetting and civil 
conspiracy, which were properly dismissed on the ground that the actions of HTEH as litigation 
counsel are privileged. 
b. Public Policv Prohibits Litigation Tactics Used to Disrupt Ongoing 
Litigation. 
Public policy against allowing litigation conduct to disrupt the judicial process has been 
clearly established by Idaho courts, including recognizing judicial immunity for certain judicial 
conduct. 
With certain exceptions, unimportant here, defamatory matter published in the due 
course of a judicial proceeding, having some reasonable relation to the cause, is 
absolutely privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation although 
made maliciously and with knowledge of its falsity. 
*** 
The reason for the rule is one of public policy in which the law recognizes certain 
communications as privileged and cannot be used as the basis of actionable libel. 
If litigants and ,attorneys were not privileged in their allegations in judicial 
proceedings, or if they were to be subjected to prosecution for libel under such 
circumstances as are here presented, justice would often be defeated. 
*** 
The privilege stated in this Section is based upon a public policy of securing to 
attorneys and officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice 
for their clients. 
Malmin v. Engler, 124 Idaho 733,864 P.2d 179 (Ct.App. 1993). Suing opposing counsel during the 
course of litigation is exactly the type of conduct that violates the public policy. 
For example, strategies to disqualify opposing counsel are disfavored by the courts. Tisby 
v. Buffalo General Hospital, 157 F.R.D. 157, 163 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Motions to disqualify 
opposing counsel must be viewed in the context of favoring a party's right to be represented by 
counsel of its own choice, as opposed to disqualifying as a strategic weapon."); Spence v. Flynt, 816 
P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991) ("Disqualification motions are often simply common tools of litigation 
process used for strictly strategicpurposes."), Plaintiffmoved to disqualify HTEH in theunderlying 
~ c t i o n . ~  Suing opposing counsel during the course of litigation is a tactical tool similar to (if not 
worse than) amotion for disqualification, and such tactics are disfavored in ldaho and violate public 
policy. 
5. Each Cause of Action Pled in the Complaint and Pro~osed Amended Complaint 
Was Proaerlv Dismissed Due to Insufficient. Conclusorv Pleading or as a 
Matter of Law. 
A party may not rely on pleadings which assert only legal conclusions, but must allege facts 
which, if true, state a claim for relief. Resolution Trust Cory.., v. Farmer, 823 F.Supp. 302, 309 
6Plaintiff's motion to disqualifl opposing counsel was denied. (R. Additional Clerk's 
Record, p. 521 .) In fact, the district court expressly determined that the motion was unjust. 
"Finally, ihe Court notes that PlaintifPs motion to disqualify counsel came only after the 
attorneys have been acting as counsel for their respective clients for well over a year, during 
which multiple motions have been filed, numerous hearings have been held, and extensive 
discovery has been completed. To disqualify the attorneys and law firms at this juncture would 
not only serve an injustice to the Defendant clients of the attorneys, but would serve an injustice 
to the Plaintiff." (See Respondent's Second Motion to Augment.) 
(E.D.Pa. 1993). While well-pled facts alleged in the complaint are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, conclusory allegations are not accepted as true without specific factual 
allegations to support them. Rules v, Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 931 (Del. 1993); Pvoduction 
Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT, 863 A.2d 772, 781 (Del. 2004). In the present case, Plaintiff 
merely stated conclusory allegations but failed to plead any facts to support cause of action. 
a. The Complaints Fail to State a Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting. 
The Idaho courts have recognized that a party may in certain circumstances be held liable for 
aiding and abetting the tortious acts of another. See Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909,655 P.2d 
1 16 (Ct.App. 1982); Price v. Aztec, 108 Idaho 674,701 P.2d 294 (Ct.App. 1985). No Idaho case has 
been found dealing with the issue whether an attorney can be found liable for aiding and abetting the 
commission of an allegedly tortious act committed by his or her client, whether in connection with 
litigation or otherwise. Other jurisdictions that have grappled with the issue have predominantly 
(that is, with limited exceptions not applicable here) held that the attorney-client relationship 
precludes aider-abettor liability. 
A number of cases have held that a lawyer acting on behalf of his or her client and within the 
scope of the attorney-client relationship is not liable for assisting the client in allegedly wrongful 
conduct. See, e.g., Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756 (N.M. 2007), reversed on other grounds by 204 
P.3d 19 (N.M. 2009), (holding that an attorney who represented an insurer in a claim arbitration 
could not he held liable for aiding and abetting the insurer's allegedly wrongful denial of the claim); 
Morin v. Trupin, 71 1 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that attorneys who represented their 
client in negotiations regarding the collection of allegedly fraudulent promissory notes were not 
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liable to an adverse party for aiding and abetting their client in seeking to enforce the notes); Camp 
v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8Ih Cir. 1991) (holding that a corporate attorney could not be held liable for 
securities fraud solely on the basis of advice given to his client). 
A case where the plaintiffs asserted claims strikingly similar to those in the present case is 
Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 351 B.R. 685 (D.Ariz. 2006), where suit was brought by 
shareholders of a corporation against the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis ("Law Firm") for allegedly 
aiding and abetting its clients, the parties in control of a corporation, to breach their fiduciary duties. 
The shareholders also alleged that Law Firm committed professional malpractice and tortiously 
interfered with the plaintiffs' contractual relations and prospective economic advantage. Law Firm 
moved for and was granted summaryjudgment with respect to the aiding and abetting claim on the 
ground Law Firm did no more than provide legal advice to its own clients? The court found that 
Law Firm's act of giving advice to its clients, even if such advice were faulty, did not constitute 
aiding and abetting the alleged torts.' 
A third party's claim against a lawyer puts the lawyer at odds with his or her client in a 
manner which compromises the attorney-client relationship. Protecting that relationship protects 
more than just an individual or entity in any particular case or transaction; it is fundamental to the 
integrity of the judicial process itself. As pointed out in Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756,761 (N.M. 
7The court also dismissed the malpractice claim because Law Firm had no attorney-client 
relationship with the plaintiffs and dismissed the tortious interference claims because "the mere 
act of giving legal advice to a client cannot constitute tortious interference." Id. at 701. 
'Law Firm advised bringing in a "crisis manager". This turned out to be disastrous, as the 
crisis manager dissipated the corporation's assets and led to its demise. Id. at 691-692. 
2007), to permit aiding and abetting claims against attorneys by adversary parties in civil litigation 
would have a chilling effect on representation because: 
[Alnytime a plaintiff alleged that a defendant had breached a fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiff, an additional claim against the defendant's counsel for aiding and abetting 
would withstand a Rule [12(b)(6)] motion, even though the defendant's counsel had 
simply been representing the client's position in an adversarial proceeding. Before 
agreeing to represent a client, an attorney faced with this dilemma would have to 
evaluate the merits of his client's position and the attendant risks, then would have 
to monitor the case during the representation in order to evaluate the risk of liability. 
This would have a detrimental effect on the representation. . . . 
Id. at 761. 
Plaintips claims against HTEH for purportedly aiding and abetting its clients' actions was 
properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 
b. The Complaints Fail to State a Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy. 
"A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only if there is an agreement 
between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an 
unlawful manner." McPhetevs v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003). "An 
agreement between two or more persons, to do or accomplish something which is in itself lawful and 
does not contemplate or employ any unlawful means for its consummation, and which does not 
injure or damage the prospective victim (so called), is not actionable." Kloppenburg v. Mays, 60 
Idaho 19, 88 P.2d 513 (1939). Thus, "[clivil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief." 
McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321 (emphasis added). Rather, "civil conspiracy is a 
derivative tort that relies on an underlying actionable wrong." Cunningham v. Jensen, 2005 WC 
2220022, at *8 (Idaho 2005). 
The complaint and proposed amended complaint in the present case is legally insufficient 
because it fails to allege either that HTEH committed an unlawful act with its clients or it engaged 
in lawful conduct with its clients in order to achieve an unlawful objective. Not only is it not 
unlawful for attorneys to represent their clients zealously in litigation, they are under a duty to do so. 
(i) Agents Cannot Conspire with their Principal. 
"[Ilt is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal." Hawey v. Fearless 
Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1978). The explanation for this rule is that, 
"[slince a corporate entity cannot conspire with itselq,] a civil conspiracy is not legallv possible 
where a corporation and its alleged coconspirators are not separate entities, but, rather, stand in either 
a principal-agent or employer-employee relationship with the corporation." 16 Am.Jur.2d 
Conspiracy 5 56 (1998) (emphasis added). 
Idaho follows this "fundamental" principle of conspiracy law. See Afron Energy, Inc. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 122 Idaho 333,340,834 P.2d 850, 857 (1992) ("A corporation cannot conspire 
with its officers or agents to violate the antitrust laws."). "[Allthough a corporation's agents may 
render the corporation liable for torts committed in the scope of their employment, an agent or 
multiple agents may not render the corporation liable for a civil conspiracy involving only corporate 
agents." McClain v. Pactiv Carp., 602 S.E.2d 87,90 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). 
In other words, HTEH is legally incapable of "conspiring" with its clients to hann Plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this reality by alternative pleading is ineffectual. While he attempts to 
plead, in the alternative, the existence of an agency relationship, to deny the existence of such a 
relationship or to claim that HTEH acted outside the scope of its agency relationship, these 
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alternative allegations are wholly conclusory and do not survive the 12(b)(6) dismissal. 
(ii) The Complaints Fail to Plead Conspiracy with Particularity. 
Even if Plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim was legally tenable, it is inadequately pleaded. 
Where the "object of the alleged conspiracy is fiaudulent," civil conspiracy must be pleaded with 
particularity. Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989,990-92 (9th Cir. 2006). 
Rule 9th) '~  pleading standards apply. In addition to pleading the circumstances of fraud with 
particularity, the plaintiff is required to "plead at least the basic elements of the conspiracy, 
especially the existence of an agreement." Wasco, 435 F.3d at 990. In other words, "[tlo 
successfully plead [a civil conspiracy] cause of action, Plaintiff must more clearly allege specific 
action on the part of each defendant that corresponds to the elements of a conspiracy cause of 
action." Accuimage Diagnostics Covp v. Teravecon. Inc., 260 F. Supp.2d 941,948 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
Here, however, Plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim is devoid of any specific allegations 
supporting even the basic elements of a conspiracy, let alone the elements of fraud. Rather than 
plead any facts detailing the supposed conspiracy, including any conspiratorial agreement and the 
role each individual played in the conspiracy, Plaintiff merely makes conclusory assertions that a 
conspiracy existed and the claim was properly dismissed. 
c. The Complaints Fail to State a Claim for Conversion. 
Plaintiff alleges conversion of an indeterminate sum of money. Conversion has been defined 
as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's personal property in denial [ofl or 
inconsistent with [the] rights therein. " Tovix v. Allred, 100 Idaho 905, 919, 606 P.2d, 334, 339 
(1980). "Conversion in the legal sense applies only to personal property." Rowe v. Bzivvup, 95 Idaho 
747,750,518 P.2d 1386 (1974). 
Plaintiff cannot state a valid claim for conversion against HTEH, however, for three reasons: 
(1) Plaintiff does not own or have a possessory interest in the money claimed; (2) HTEH has not 
wrongfully asserted dominion over the money claimed; and (3) the money claimed by Plaintiff is not 
identifiable as a specific chattel. Plaintiffs conversion claim therefore fails as a matter of law and 
was properly dismissed. 
(i) Plaintiff Does Not Own the Sum of Money Claimed. 
In order to state a valid claim for conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has 
title to the property claimed, or a right of possession. Portland Seed Co. v. Clark, 35 Idaho 44,46- 
47, 204 P. 146, 146-47 (1922). "Generally, a plaintiff must establish legal ownership or right to 
possession in the particular thing, the specifically identifiable moneys, that the defendant is alleged 
to have converted." Macomber v. Travelers Property and Caswlty Corp., 804 A.2d 180,199 (Conn. 
2002). No action for conversion of money may be brought if the plaintiff did not have ownership, 
possession or control of the subject money. Flute, Znc. v. Rubel, 682 F.Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
The allegations of Plaintiffs complaints do not identi& what specific sum of money plaintiff 
purportedly owns or is entitled to possess or control. Plaintiff alleges that he is a creditor of AIA 
Services (See Complaint, 77 51-55) whose right to payment of the debt has not been established and 
was at issue in the Underlying Action. (See Complaint, 77 15-16.)9 At best, Plaintiff had a claim 
to a sum of money. At the time of the dismissal Plaintiff had no right to any liquidated sum. 
'~ecently, Plaintiffs alleged rights in this respect were determined adversely to him. 
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Plaintiff therefore failed to establish a necessary element of his cause of action for conversion. 
(ii) HTEH Has Not Wrongfully Asserted Dominion Over the Property. 
A claim for conversion fails if the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant wrongfully 
exerted dominion over the subject personal property. See Tovix v. Allred, 100 Idaho 905,910,606 
P.2d 1334, 1339 (1980). "No conversion action can exist against a defendant who did not exercise 
any form of dominion or control over the property that was allegedly converted." US. Claims, Inc. 
v. Flomenhaft, 519 F.Supp.2d 532,536 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
In this case, HTEH is not alleged to have taken any property directly from plaintiff. Instead, 
Plaintiffs complaints allege HTEH was compensated for attorney fees and costs incurred in 
defending its clients in the Underlying Action filed by Plaintiff. (Complaint, f i  54.) Idaho law 
clearly permits corporations to hire attorneys to represent the corporations' interests and to 
compensate those attorneys for their services. See I.C. § 30-1 -302(1) (general corporate power to 
defend in its name); LC. 8 30-1-302(7) (general corporate power to make contracts and to incur 
liabilities); LC. 8 30-1 -302(15) (general corporate power to make payments that further the business 
and affairs of the corporation). AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA were legally authorized 
to hire HTEH and to pay the attorney fees and costs incurred relating to the defense of the claims 
asserted against the corporations in the Underlying ~ct ion."  Therefore, any exertion of dominion 
or control over the attorney fees and costs paid to HTEH, whether by AIA Services, AIA Insurance, 
''Tl~is was confirmed by the district court when it @anted a Preliminary Injunction 
allowing the corporation to continue to operate per usual during the pendency of the Underlying 
Action. (R. Additional Clerk's record, p. 521.) 
or CropUSA cannot be wrongful such that a claim for conversion arises in favor of Plaintiff against 
HTEH. 
(iii) Plaintiffs Claimed Sum of Money Is Not a Specific Chattel. 
Plaintiffs conversion claim against HTEH alleges only the conversion of an indeterminate 
amount of money. "Normally conversion for misappropriation of money does not lie unless it can 
be describedor ident$ed as a spectfic chattel." Warm Springs Properties, Inc. v. Andora Villa, Inc., 
96 Idaho 270, 272, 526 P.2d 1106 (1974) (emphasis added). "More particularly, if the alleged 
converted money is incapable of being described or identified in the same manner as a specific 
chattel, it is not the proper subject of a conversion action." High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 
F.Supp.2d 420,428 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
An action for conversion of money is insufficient as a matter of law unless it is 
alleged that the money converted was in specific tangible funds of which claimant 
was the owner and entitled to immediate possession. An action for conversion does 
not lie to enforce a mere obligation to pay money. 
Ehrliclz v. Howe, 848 F.Supp. 482, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). "In other words, an action alleging 
conversion ofmoney lies only where there is an obligation to deliver the specific pieces of themoney 
in question or money that has been specifically sequestered, rather than a mere obligation to deliver 
a certain sum." SouthTrust Bankv. Donley, 925 So.2d 934,940 (Ala. 2005).Ii Evenif Plaintiff were 
a pledgee, shareholder, director or creditor of AL4 Services or AIA Insurance, he would have no 
"Idaho Code $28-9-332 provides in relevant part: (a) A transferee of money takes the 
money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in 
violating the rights of the secured party; and (b) A transferee of funds from a deposit account 
takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in 
collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party. 
personal right to possess or exert dominion over the assets of either corporation, including those 
funds paid as attorney fees. 
The complaint fails to allege that HTEH exerted control over or possessionof any identifiable 
personal property belonging to Plaintiff or in which he possessed a perfected security interest. It is 
alleged only that HTEH accepted payment of attorney's fees and costs." 
There is nothing improper about AIA Services and AIA Insurance retaining counsel to 
defend them in the Underlying Action or paying the fees of their defense counsel. The existence of 
a claim by an alleged secured creditor does not preclude a debtor from paying its legal bills or other 
obligations as they fall due. If Plaintiffs conversion theory were correct, then neither of the AIA 
entities could pay the wages of its employees, rent, taxes, operating expenses or amounts owing to 
trade creditors. All payments to anyone other than the alleged secured creditor, Plaintiff, would be 
improper. 
d. The Comvlaints Fail to State a Cause of Action for Violation of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. 
PIaintiff alleges violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter the "Act"). 
Plaintiff, however, has not asserted - and indeed cannot assert - a valid claim under the Act against 
HTEH because plaintiff had no contract with HTEH from which an alleged claim could possibly 
I2paragraph 55 of the complaint alleges that defendants "assisted in the inappropriate 
titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million Mortgage owned by AIA Services Corporation. . . ." 
However, the complaint does not allege that HTEH became the owner of the mortgage or that 
HTEH at any time possessed or controlled the note and mortgage. Even if it could be inferred 
that Plaintiff claims a perfected security interest in the mortgage, which is far from clear, his 
security interest would continue despite any transfer or assignment of the mortgage. Idaho Code 
5 28-9-201(a). 
arise. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cause of action was properly dismissed as a matter of law. 
Idaho Code $5 48-603 and 48-603A set forth certain practices which are prohibited under 
the Act. Idaho Code 5 48-608(1) allows individuals to pursue a cause of action for an alleged 
violation of the Act and provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Any person who purchases or leases goods or sewices and thereby suffers an 
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or 
employment by anofherperson of a method, act orpractice declared unlawful by this 
chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative, 
may bring an action to recover damages or one thousand dollars ($1,000), which ever 
is greater .... 
I.C. 5 48-608(1) (emphasis added). 
Idaho case law limits claims under the Act to circumstances involving a clear and distinct 
contractual relationship between the parties. See Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785,640 P.2d 11 86 
(Ct.App. 1982). In Haskin, the parties entered into negotiations for the sale of real property. The 
proposed sale never occurred and the buyers, who were renting the subject property at the time, 
ultimately pursued damage claims against the sellers. The buyers later filed amotion to amend their 
pleading to assert a claim against the sellers under the Act, claiming the sellers engaged in deceptive 
acts or practices. The district court denied the buyers' motion to amend, finding that no valid claim 
could be asserted under the Act because no contract existed between the parties. On appeal, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the district court's denial of the sellers' motion to amend, and 
specifically held that a claiin under the Act must be based upon a contract: 
. . . We do not construe this language to require that a purchase or lease be 
"completed" in order for an action to be brought. However, we have reviewed the 
regulations promulgated by the Idaho Attorney General pursuant to I.C. $48-604(2), 
the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court interpreting the ICPA to date, and cases 
reportedunder 15 U.S.C. $45(a)(l), which are deemed guides to construction of the 
ICPA under LC. $ 48-604(1). We find no authority for applying the ICPA to a 
merely contemplated transaction, where there was no contract. We hold, as we 
believe the trial court intended, that a claim under the ICPA must be based upon a 
contract. 
Haskin, 102 Idaho at 788 (emphasis added). 
Similar to the facts at issue in Haskin, there is no contract in the present case between 
Plaintiff and HTEH upon which Plaintiff's claim under the Act can be based. The facts of this case 
are even W h e r  removed from those at issue in Haskin because in this case plaintiff has not alleged 
that any transaction was even "contemplated" between himself and HTEH. 
Further, the Washington Court of Appeals recently held that allowing a plaintiff to sue his 
or her adversary's attorney under a consumer protection act theory infringes on the attorney-client 
relationship. Jeckle v. Grotty, 85 P.3d 93 1 (Wash.App., 2004). In support of that finding, the court 
relied on Connecticut case law, holding as follows: 
Providing a private cause of action under [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices 
Act] to a supposedly aggrieved party for the actions of his or her opponent's attorney 
would stand the attorney-client relationship on its head and would compromise an 
attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to his or her client and thwart the exercise of the 
attorney's independent professional judgment on his or her client's behalf. Suield  
Dev. Assoc. Ltd. F'ship v. Nat'lLoan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 783-84, 802 
A.2d 44. 
Id,, 85 P,3d at 384-85. 
Not only is there a coinplete absence of any contract or consumer relationship between 
Plaintiff and HTEH which would form the basis for a claim, but Plaintiff should not be permitted 
to sue his adversaries' attorneys under the Act. 
e. The Comolaints Fail to State a Claim for Legal Malpractice or Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty. 
Plaintiff alleged causes of action for legal malpractice and for breach of the fiduciary duty. 
Ordinarily, one not in privity of contract with an attorney cannot bring suit for legal malpractice 
against the attorney. Stated otherwise, the care and skill an attorney owes his or her client ordinarily 
does not extend to third parties. National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195,205-206,25 L.Ed. 621 
(1 879); Buschev v. Boniizg, 159 P.3d 8 14 (HI 2007). 
The reasons for the privity. rule are manifold: "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty 
to a client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 
702, 703, 652 P.2d 650, 652 (1982); absent the privity rule, "clients would lose control over the 
attorney-client relationship, and attorneys would be subject to almost unlimited liability." Barcelo 
v. Elliott, 923 S.W. 2d 575, 580 (Tex. 1996); allowing a broad cause of action in favor of third 
parties would create a conflict of interest between an attorney's client and such third parties, thereby 
limiting the attorney's ability to zealously represent his or her client. Id. at 578; "Attorneys owe 
fundamental duties to their clients. Among the most important of these duties are the duties of 
zealous representation and loyalty." Heinze v. Bauev, 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597, 603 (2008). 
Those duties would be irrevocably compromised if attorneys were required to temper their 
representation by taking into account the economic or other interests of third patties. Imposing 
duties to non-clients would give rise to increased malpractice suits and cause attorneys to practice 
in a manner calculated to protect themselves personally rather than advance the interests of their 
clients. 
Plaintiffs malpractice claim fails to allege the existence of an attorney-client relationship - 
the so-called privity rule. 
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice/professional negligence, the 
plaintiff must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the 
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty of the standard 
of care by the lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a proximate 
cause of the damages suffered by the client. 
Beckev v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,526,96 P.3d 623,627 (2004), citing McColm-Traska v. Baker, 
139 Idaho 948,951,88 P.3d 767,770 (2004). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004), 
confronted the issue of whether a legal malpractice action must arise out of an attorney-client 
relationship. In that case disappointed heirs sought to bring a legal malpractice action against the 
attorney who drafted a decedent's will and three codicils. Each of the two later codicils revoked 
prior codicils. The heirs contended the codicils were intended to be cumulative. The Court 
acknowledged: "[a]s a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her 
client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship." 
Id. at 137,90 P.3d at 887. However, the Court held this is not an invariable rule and held that an 
attorney preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named in the 
instruments to effectuate the testator's intent. This is theonly instance in which the requirement of 
privity in a legal malpractice action has been abrogated under Idaho law. The Harrideld Court 
cautioned: 
A direct attorney-client relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the 
attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action except in this very narrow 
circumstance. 
Id. at 139, 90 P.3d 884. 
The reason for such cautionary linlitation was aptly expressed by the Harri&eld Court, 
quoting Pellam v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96,99-100 (111. 1982): 
While privity of contract has been abolished in many areas of tort law, the concern 
is stiIl that liability for negligence not extend to an unlimited and unknown number 
of potential plaintiffs. In the area of legal malpractice the attorney's obligations to 
his client must remain paramount. In such cases the best approach is that the 
plaintiffs must allege and prove facts demonstrating that they are in the nature of 
third-party intended beneficiaries of the relationship between the client and the 
attorney in order to recover in tort. By this we mean that to establish a duty owed by 
the defendant attorney to the nonclient the nonclient must allege and prove that the 
intent of the client to benefit the nonclient third party was the primary or direct 
purpose of the transaction or relationship. 
Id. at 137,90 P.3d at 887. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, ina case decided after Hurrigfeld, declined to create an additional 
exception to theprivity requirement. In Taylor13 v. Muile, 142 Idaho 253,127 P.3d 156 (2005), the 
remainder beneficiaries of a trust, attempted to sue the trustee's attorney for legal malpractice. After 
a thorough discussion of HarriRfeld the Court affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the claim 
of malpractice against the attorney: 
The third count of the complaint asserts a professional malpractice claim 
against Mr. Maile and this count is precluded by the general rule espoused in 
Harriafeld that an attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for 
holding the attorney liable for negligence in the performance of legal services. 
Id. at 259, 127 P.3d 156. 
The Court in Taylor also upheld dismissal of the claim of breach of fiduciary duty against 
"This is the same Taylor who is the Plaintiff in the present case. 
-31- 
the attorney because he had assumed no fiduciary duty to them; he was acting as counsel for the 
fiduciary rather than as a fiduciary himself - an important distinction. 
Plaintiffs complaints are deficient because they fail to allege facts to establish an attorney- 
client relationship between HTEH and himself, the existence of any duty on the part of HTEH to 
him, or the breach of any duty owing by HTEH to him, and fails entirely to allege how any act or 
omission of HTEH was the proximate cause of any damages allegedly suffered by him. 
f. The Com~laints Fail to State a Cause of Action for Intentional Interference 
With Contract. 
The analysis of interference with contractual relations is similar to that of civil conspiracy 
above. A party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut'l 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650,654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993). A principal and agent are 
treated as one for purposes of analyzing whether tortious interference with contract has occurred. 
It is a legal absurdity to allege that an agent interfered with its principal's contract. See BECO 
Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., I45 Idaho 719, 184 P.3d 844 (2008). 
Although J-U-B was not a party to the Construction Contract in the traditional sense, 
it acted as the city's agent by the very terms of the contract between BECO and the 
city. This case falls within the purview of Ostrander where an intentional 
interference claim was found not to lie against an agent of a party who was acting 
within the scope of his authority. 
BECO Const. Inc. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 725, 184 P.3d 844, 850 (2008). The 
relationship between an attorney and his or her client is that principal and agent. See Cvockett & 
Meyers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP, 440 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1194-95 (D.Nev. 2006) 
(because a party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with that contract, party's law firm cannot 
be liable for the tort as a matter of law); American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Zavale, 302 F.Supp.2d 
1108, 11 17-18 (D.Ariz. 2003) (lawyers act as their client's agents, their alter egos, and therefore 
generally are not capable of interfering with their contractual relations). An attorney cannot be held 
liable for interference with contract by giving advice to the client within the scope of the attorney's 
representation of the client. Plaintiffs complaints failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action for 
intentional interference with contract. 
g. The Com~laints Fail to State a Cause of Action for Fraud or Constructive 
Fraud. 
A party must establish nine elements to prove actual fraud. Glaze v. Defenbaugh, 144 Idaho 
829,833,172 P.3d 1 104,1108 (2007). Moreover, fraud must be pled with particularity pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 9@). Plaintiff appears to concede in his Appellant's Brief that there were insufficient, 
particular facts pled in favor of actual fraud by choosing instead to focus upon constructive fraud. 
Regardless, the complaints do not allege sufficient, particular facts and actual fraud was properly 
dismissed on Rule 12(b)(6).I4 
"An action in constructive fraud exists when there has been a breach of a duty arising &om 
a relationship of trust and confidence, as in a fiduciary duty." Wines v. Wines, 129 Idaho 847,853, 
934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). "Examples of relationships from which the law will impose fiduciary 
obligations on the parties include when the parties are: members of the same family, partners, 
I4Neither complaint pleads the nine elements nor any facts in support of the nine 
elements. Plaintiff does not identify what averments in the complaints would meet the pleading 
requirement; nor does he address the Rule 9 particularity requirement. In fact, Plaintiff does not 
even expressly state what the actual fraud or constructive fraud is. 
attorney and client, executor and beneficiary of an estate, principal and agent, insurer and insured, 
or close friends." Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837,844,820 P.2d 707,714 (Ct.App. 1991). 
Neither complaint alleges any of these relationships between Plaintiff and HTEH. Moreover, as 
discussed above, there is no duty to breach since none is owed by opposing counsel's attorneys in 
ongoing litigation. Plaintiffs relationship with opposing counsel did not rise to that of trust or 
confidence and certainly did not rise to the level of a fiduciary relationship. "The jist of a 
constructive fraud finding is to avoid the need to prove intent (i.e.: knowledge of falsity or intent to 
induce reliance) [under the elements required to prove actual fraud], since it is inferred directly from 
therelationship and thebreach." County Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595,601,150 P.3d288, 
294 (2006). In Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 106 N.M. 757, 750 P.2d 118 
(1988), the court rejected plaintiffs attempt to allege causes of action for constructive fraud and 
other torts based on counsel's statements upon which a litigation adversary allegedly relied to his 
detriment. The court found that imposition of the requisite legal or equitable duty to the plaintiff 
"would be contrasy to an attorney's duty to represent his client and pursue his client's interests with 
undivided loyalty." Id., 750 P.2d at 124. However, the party is still required to prove the remaining 
seven elements of actual kaud. Gray v. Pi- Way Const. Services, Inc., - Idaho -, 21 0 P.3d 63 
(09.9 ISCR 465) (2009). 
Regardless of HTEH's alleged knowledge of falsity or intent that Plaintiffrely on statements 
or representations of fact, Plaintiffs claim for constructive fraud still fails. Plaintiffhas not alleged 
with sufficient particularity facts to support the remaining seven elements of actual fraud. Plaintiff 
cannot establish that HTEH owed him a duty, let alone breached any such duty. Moreover, Plaintiff 
cannot establish a relationship of trust and coilfidence between himself and HTEH, his adversaries' 
attorneys. Finally, there are no facts (nor could there be) that support Plaintiffs justifiable reliance 
upon any statements or actions takenby HTEH given the adversarial nature of theunderlying Action 
from which the Malpractice Action springs. 
6. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denvine the Motion to 
Amend the Com~laiut Since Anv Such Amendment Would be Futile. 
a. Amendine; the Comvlaint Would be Futile Where the Plaintiff Cannot State 
a Cause of Action. 
With respect to Plaintiffs so-called direct claims, leave to amend should be denied because, 
as a matter of law, he has not and, indeed, cannot state a cause of action against counsel for opposing 
parties. While the district court cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence in deciding whether 
to allow the proposed amendment, Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 
44,122 P.3d 300 303 (2005), sufficiency of the evidence is not an issue here because the attempt to 
sue attorneys not in privity with the plaintiffis barred as a matter of law. 
(i) As a Matter of Law, the Defendants Owed No Duty to Plaintiff. 
Except in the narrow circumstance of an attorney drafting testamentary instruments, an 
attorney owes no duty under Idaho law to third parties who are not his clients. Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,139,90 P.3d 884,889 (2004). The proposed amended complaint does not 
allege any facts that would come within the Harrideld exception. Therefore, the district court 
properly denied the motion to amend, because as a matter of law HTEH cannot be liable to Plaintiff 
under any cause of action requiring a duty. 
(ii) As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Sue Opposing 
Parties' Counsel. 
Plaintiff lacks standing to sue lawyers who do not represent him. It would be a futile act to 
grant leave to amend the complaint where it fails to allege a viable cause of action whether 
denominated legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty or any other tort. In the present case, the 
amended complaint alleged no facts which would give Plaintiff standing to sue HTEH. It would be 
a futile act to grant leave to amend the complaint merely to assert nonviable claims. 
(iii) As a Matter of Law, Plaintiff Lacks Privity with HTEH. 
In the absence of privity, the Plaintiff has no cause of action against HTEH for torts, 
Ifarrideld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,139,90 P.3d 884,889 (2004), includes breach of fiduciary 
duty, Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253,127 P.3d 156 (2005). Since the proposed amended complaint 
fails to allege any facts which would establish privity, leave to amend was properly denied. 
(iv) As a Matter of Law, PIaintiff Has No Cause of Action under the 
I.C.P.A. 
In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff attempts to allege a direct cause of action for 
breach of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code $ 5  48-601 through 48-619. However, a 
private cause of action may be asserted under that Act only by a 'person who purchases or leases 
goods or services and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property. . . ." Idaho Code 
5 48-608. The proposed amended complaint does not contain allegations that Plaintiff purchased 
goods or services Erom HTEH. Granting leave to amend to bring a fatally flawed claim under the 
Act would be futile. 
(v) As a Matter of Law, Plaintiffs Purported Claims for Conspiracy and 
Tortious Interference Are Deficient. 
Plaintiff sought to "clarify" causes of action in his proposed amended complaint for tortious 
interference with contract and civil conspiracy. However, theproposed amended complaint still fails 
to allege that HTEH acted in any capacity other than as counsel for their corporate clients. The 
relationship of attorney-client is one of principal and agent. Jarrnan v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270,731 
P.2d 8 13 (1986). As a matter of law, an agent cannot conspire with his principal. Afton Energy, Znc. 
v. Idaho Power Co., 122 Idaho 333,340,834 P.2d 850,857 (1992. An attorney does not "conspire" 
with his own client merely by giving advice. "To hold othetwise would be akin to saying that 'a 
defendant could conspire with his right a m ,  which held, aimed, and fired the fatal weapon."' 
Fischei- v. Estate ofHax, 816 A.2d 1, 5, n.4 (D.C. 2003). Nor can the agent be held to have 
interfered with his principal's contract. BECO Const. Co., Znc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 
719, 184 P.3d 844 (2008). 
Accordingly, the proposed amended complaint does not allege actionable claims against 
HTEH for civil conspiracy or tortious interference. Leave to amend was properly denied with 
respect to these claims. 
(vi) As a Matter of Law, HTEH is Shielded by the Litigation Privilege. 
As attorneys for parties adverse to Plaintiff, HTEH is not subject to suit by him for its actions 
taken in connection with litigation. Insofar as the proposed amended complaint attempts to state 
claims based on defendants' litigation strategy, positions taken in open court, cooperation with co- 
counsel in defending against Plaintiffs claims, or other matters collaterally related to pending 
litigation such as payment of litigation expenses, resisting the opposing party's attempts to possess 
property, or negotiating, or declining to negotiate, with opposing counsel, HTEH's actions are 
privileged as a matter of law. The proposed amended complaint is an exercise in futility because it 
merely seeks to advance claims which cannot survive assertion of the defense of litigation privilege. 
(vii) As a Matter of Law, Plaintiffs Claim for Conversion Does Not State 
a Claim upon which Relief Can Be Granted. 
Plaintiff attempts in his proposed amended complaint to plead his claim for conversion in 
slightly different terms, which are nonetheless insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiffs theory seems 
to be that HTEH can be held liable for conversion if it can be shown that its fees were paid with the 
proceeds of assets in which the plaintiff alleges he possesses a perfected security interest. If 
plaintiffs conversion theory were to be accepted, every person who accepts payment from a client 
or customer for services rendered would be subject to suit for conversion by the secured creditor of 
such client or customer. The Uniform Commercial Code rejects this approach. In Lake Ontario 
Production Credit Association ofRochester v. Grove Hogan, 138 A.D.2d 930 (N.Y. 1988), adebtor 
sold cows in which the plaintiff possessed a perfected security interest. At least part of the proceeds 
from the sale of the cows was used to pay the debtor's attorneys. The court held that the secured 
creditor could trace the proceeds from the sale of the collateral only insofar as such proceeds 
remained in the hands of the debtor. The law firm which received payment from the sale of 
collateral took free of any claim by the secured creditor. While the UCC has been amended and 
renumbered since the date of the Grove Hogan case, the concept continues under the current version 
of the Code. See Idaho Code 5 28-9-332 (persons who in good faith receive payment ofmoney from 
a debtor for services rendered take free and clear of any security interest in such money). Because 
plaintiff's conversion allegations do not raise any justiciable issue, it would be futile to grant leave 
to amend. 
b. Plaintiffs Attemvt to Frame His Amended Complaint as a Derivative Action 
is Inaccurate and Unavailing. 
For the first time, Plaintiff alleged in the proposed amended complaint that he is entitled to 
bring not only direct claims on his own behalf, but also a shareholder's derivative action. This is the 
primary and perhaps only substantive change in the proposed amended c~mplaint. '~ 
The shareholder's derivative action was developed as an extraordinary equitable device to 
enable shareholders to enforce a corporate right that the corporation failed to assert on its own 
behalf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,811 (Del. 1984). 
The corporation is the real party in interest and the shareholder is only a nominal 
plaintiff. The substantive claim belongs to the corporation. . . . 
13 W. Fletcher et at., Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 5 5941.10 (1995 Rev.) 
"Because a corporation exists as a separate legal entity, the shareholders have no direct cause 
of action or right of recovery against those who have harmed it. A shareholder may not maintain an 
action on his own behalf for a wrong done by a third person to the corporation on the theory that 
such wrong devalued his stock because such an action would lead to multitudinous litigation. Szcttev 
I5It is doubtful whether the purported derivative claims are properly classified as such. 
Paragraph 13 of the proposed amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to bring 
derivative claims but then asserts that he is personally entitled to "recover and possess all funds, 
damages andlor property recovered froin all direct and derivative causes of action." It is a 
findamentat principle that derivative claims belong to the corporation, not the shareholder(s) 
who bring the derivative action on the corporation's behalf. 
v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal2d 525,530, 170 P.2d 898 (1946). "When a derivative action 
is successful, the corporation is the only party that benefits from at any recovery; the shareholders 
derive no benefit 'except the indirect benefit resulting from a realization upon the corporation's 
assets."' Grossett v. Wenaas, 175 P.3d at 1 190. 
(i) Plaintiff Is Not a Shareholder. 
Idaho Code 9 30-1-741 provides that a person cannot commence or maintain a derivative 
proceeding unless he "[wlas a shareholder at the time of the act or omission complained of or 
became a shareholder through transfer by operation of law from one (1) who was a shareholder at 
that time." The proposed amended complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was a shareholder at the 
time of the acts complained of. His status is that of former shareholder whose stock was redeemed 
and who now seeks to recover the balance owing notwithstanding the insolvency of the corporation. 
This does not qualifL him as a "shareholder." He ceased to be a shareholder when his stock was 
redeemed. Whether or not he will ever again become a shareholder by operation of law or otherwise 
remains unlikely. Nor does his security interest in the stock of AIA Insurance, make him a 
shareholder. Whether or not his security interest is enforceable and, if so, whether he possesses any 
right other than to sell the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner had not been adjudicated 
when the district court dismissed his complaint. 
(ii) Plaintiff Does Not Fairly Represent the Interests of the Corporations. 
The shareholder bringing the derivative action must "fairly and adequately represents the 
interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation." Idaho Code fj 30-1-741. It is 
impossible to conceive of any way that Plaintiff can be said to represent the interest of AIA Services 
or AIA Insurance, or the larger community of shareholders. In every respect, his personal interest 
is adverse to the corporations and hostile to the interests of other shareholders. Payment of even a 
substantial portion of the balance due for the redemption of his stock will bankrupt the corporations 
and leave nothing for other  shareholder^.'^ The district court properly determined that Plaintiffs 
proposed amendment to add derivative claims was futile. 
7. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding HTEH Attorney 
Fees. -
a. Idaho Code 6 12-121. 
It is appropriate to award fees pursuant to § 12-121 where the district court is not asked to 
establish any new legal standards, nor to modify or clarify any existing legal standards but the focus 
of the action is the application of settled law to the facts. Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719,662 P.2d 
1 163 (Ct.App. 1983). The present case, whileunusual, is not a case of first impressionnor is it novel 
for purposes of avoiding an award of attorney fees. In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253,259,127 P.3d 
156, 162 (2002), this Court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue an attorney where they have no 
attorneylclient relationship. Plaintiff in the present action is aware of the controlling principles of 
law enunciated in that case, since he was one of the Plaintiffs in Maile. Nevertheless, in the present 
case, he asserted similar claims against attorneys with whom he had no attorneylclient relationship. 
Moreover, he did so during the course of litigation and after a previous, failed attempt to disqualify 
I6See, for example, f/ 17 of the proposed amended complaint, which alleges that the debt 
allegedly owing by AIA Services to Plaintiff exceeds its assets by $3 million, and 7 29 of the 
proposed amended complaint which alleges that AIA Services is insolvent and unable to pay the 
amount allegedly owing to Plaintiff. 
-41- 
those same attorneys in the Underlying Action. Where a party wilfully asserts claims that are 
contrary to establish law, imposition of fees under § 12-121 is appr~priate.'~ 
b. Idaho Code 6 30-1-746(2). (3). 
Upon termination of a shareholder's derivative action, a district court may require the 
Plaintiff to pay Defendant's reasonable expenses and attorney fees if it finds the proceedings were 
commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose or were not well 
grounded. See Idaho Code 5 30-1-746(2) and (3). The Official Comment to 5 30-1-746 states that 
among the purposes of the statute are to deter strike suits and prevent proceedings which may be 
brought to harass the corporation or its officers. Here, Plaintiff attempted to bring derivative actions 
against his adversaries' attorneys during the course of litigation. He did so after a failed attempt to 
disqualify these same attorneys. He did so despite the fact that he was not a shareholder at the time 
of the alleged acts and omissions complained of and despite clear law that derivative actions can only 
be brought by a shareholder. Moreover, the complaints clearly show that Plaintiff was not seeking 
to protect or benefit the corporation but rather himself. Based on the above, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to award HTEH its attorney fees under this statute. 
c. Idaho Code 6 48-608(5). 
Under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act costs, including reasonable attorney fees, be 
"The district court clearly perceived the award of attorney fees as one of discretion, 
specifically cited to the rules and statutes upon which he based his award, analyzed his decision 
against the legal standards and based his decision on his observations of Plaintiffs legal 
wranglings in both the Underlying Action and this case. As such, there was no abuse of 
discretion in awarding HTEH its attorney fees. 
allowed to the prevailing party unless the district court otherwise directs. See Idaho Code 5 48- 
608(5). The district court must, however, find that Plaintiffs action is spurious or brought for 
harassment purposes only. Id. HTEH was clearly the prevailing party on all claims, including the 
Act. Based on the tactics described in the paragraphs above, coupled with the undeniable fact that 
Plaintiff did not purchase or lease any goods or services from HTEH, a threshold requirement under 
the Act, there was no abuse of discretion in awarding attorney fees under this statute. 
8. HTEH is Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs on Ap~eal. 
HTEH requests that it be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Idaho Code $5 12-121,30-1-746 and 48-608(5). An award of 
attorney fees is appropriate "if law is well settled and the Appellants have made no substantial 
showing that the District Court misapplied the law." Rowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 
377, 973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999). Here, the law regarding suits against attorneys under Taylor v. 
Maile, 143 Idaho 253, 258, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), is well settled, and Plaintiff has made no 
substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law. There is objective evidence that the 
Malpractice Action was brought to disrupt the Underlying Action and the attorneylclient relationship 
between HTEH and its clients. This appeal was brought without foundation, is spurious, and was 
brought for harassment purposes making costs and fees on appeal appropriate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court's dismissal of the complaint, denial of the request to file an amended 
complaint and grant of attorney fees should be affirmed. In addition, HTEH should be awarded its 
fees and costs on appeal. 
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